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INTRODUCTION 
John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky’s civil recourse theory purports to be 
descriptive and unitary. It cannot be both. According to this theory, as a positive 
matter, tort law is unified by wrongs and is not designed to be used as an 
instrument for purposes such as compensation and deterrence. In this Article, I 
argue that civil recourse theory does not offer a complete description of twenty-
first-century tort law. Tort law is not just about civil recourse; at least part of tort 
law’s purpose is instrumental. The extent of routinization in tort law, particularly in 
automobile accident claims, demonstrates a gap between civil recourse theory and 
the tort law it is supposed to describe. In the trenches, insurers and plaintiffs’ 
lawyers are concerned about the profitability of their portfolio of cases as a whole. 
Insurers and many plaintiffs’ lawyers, therefore, routinize the claims system, 
increasing its administrability and the compensation of claimants, but reducing or 
eliminating the importance of wrongs in a large portion of cases. Civil recourse 
theory fails as a descriptive unitary theory of tort law because it does not accurately 
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describe automobile accident claims, constituting a majority of tort claims and 
three-quarters of tort payments.1 
Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge that instrumentalism shapes the nature of 
tort law’s wrongs.2 Moreover, they concede that the practice of routinizing claims 
is a “potential red flag[]”3 and that “tort law is in some ways out of synch with this 
trend.”4 Goldberg and Zipursky’s admissions are necessary for a descriptive theory 
of torts, but they reveal civil recourse’s implicit pluralism. If civil recourse is to 
remain unitary, it must be articulated as a normative, rather than descriptive, theory. 
I. CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY 
A. Core Claims 
As currently espoused by Goldberg and Zipursky, civil recourse is descriptive.5 
It attempts to describe tort law as it is, not as it should be. Distilled to its essence, 
civil recourse theory asserts that tort law’s purpose is “providing victims with an 
avenue of civil recourse against those who have wrongfully injured them.”6 In his 
presentation at the 2012 Association of American Law Schools (AALS) annual 
meeting, Goldberg stated that civil recourse theory was composed of three core 
“levels” or “components:” (1) rights of action, (2) wrongs, and (3) remedies.7 The 
first component, rights of action, arms people with a legal power; this is victim 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. JAMES M. ANDERSON, PAUL HEATON & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, THE U.S. 
EXPERIENCE WITH NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 1 (2010), available at http://www.
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG860.pdf; see also ROBERT 
C. LAFOUNTAIN, RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER, SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, CHANTAL G. 
BROMAGE, SARAH A. GIBSON & ASHLEY N. MASON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 
28 (2010), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/
Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx. 
 2. Goldberg & Zipursky Respond to the Quandaries Facing Civil Recourse Theory, 
TORTSPROF BLOG (Jan. 12, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/2012/01/goldberg-
zipursky-respond-to-the-quandaries-facing-civil-recourse-theory.html. 
 3. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. 
LAW: TORTS 396 (2010). 
 4. Id. at 394. 
 5. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great 
Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 403 (2005) (“Our point here is not that [the principle of civil 
recourse] is demanded by principles of justice, or even morally sound, but that it is the 
animating idea behind our system of tort law.”). 
 6. John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1221, 
1252 (2008). 
 7. John C.P. Goldberg, Address at the Association of American Law Schools Annual 
Meeting, Twenty-First Century Tort Theories: A New Audit of Civil Recourse Theory (Jan. 5, 
2012) [hereinafter Goldberg Podcast], available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/2012/
07/podcast-of-2012-aals-panel-on-civil-recourse-theory.html. Cf. Christopher J. Robinette, Why 
Civil Recourse Theory Is Incomplete, 78 TENN. L. REV. 431, 433–40 (2011); Jane Stapleton, 
Evaluating Goldberg & Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1529–32 
(2006). 
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empowerment.8 People are empowered through tort law when they experience a 
wrong, the second component of civil recourse theory. Goldberg and Zipursky also 
refer to civil recourse theory as “torts as wrongs,”9 and wrongs are clearly the crux 
of civil recourse. As Goldberg and Zipursky assert: “[W]e believe that tort liability 
is predicated on the commission of a wrong—a failure to act in accordance with a 
relational norm of right conduct—that in turn generates in a victim of the wrong a 
power to respond to the wrongdoer.”10 Finally, if the victim proves the wrong, he or 
she is entitled to the third level of civil recourse theory, a remedy. According to 
civil recourse theory, remedies are not about a duty to repair, but a right of 
redress.11 As Goldberg notes, “[t]he animating ideas here are relational and 
retaliatory, involving notions of empowerment, response, and satisfaction.”12  
B. Instrumentalism 
The origin of civil recourse theory lies in its rejection of an instrumentalist tort 
law. Goldberg and Zipursky specifically contrast their view with the Holmes-
Prosser understanding13 that “[t]ort law is about shifting losses to achieve policy 
objectives, not wrongs and recourse.”14 Pursuant to this instrumentalist view, the 
most common policy objectives allegedly served by tort law are compensation (or 
loss-spreading) and deterrence,15 but sometimes scholars include constraints such 
as administrability to the mix.16 Instrumentalism, considered by Goldberg and 
Zipursky to be the dominant view in the modern torts academy, has been their 
target from the beginning.  
According to Goldberg and Zipursky, as a descriptive matter, tort law is not an 
instrument to achieve policy objectives; it is about wrongs, and only about wrongs. 
As such it is “unitary.”17 A plaintiff has a cause of action “only because the 
defendant has committed a legal wrong against the plaintiff”;18 thus, the role of tort 
law “is not to deliver deterrence [or] compensation.”19 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Goldberg Podcast, supra note 7. 
 9. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 917 (2010). 
 10. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1150 (2007). 
 11. See id. 
 12. John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 436 (2006). 
 13. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1733, 1752–77 (1998). 
 14. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 924.  
 15. Id. at 927. But see infra note 19 and accompanying text. Goldberg & Zipursky 
identify influential scholars in the instrumentalist tradition as including panel participant 
Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner, who received the 2012 Prosser Award during the panel 
presentation. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 924, 926–27. 
 16. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1251. 
 17. Id. at 1251–52. 
 18. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1625, 1643 (2002). 
 19. John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of 
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C. Instrumentalism as a Source of the Wrongs 
Tort law is certainly unified by wrongs if all that means is that torts consists 
only of the causes of action, or “wrongs,” created by courts or legislatures. That, 
however, is the “vacuous” understanding of legal wrongs that Goldberg and 
Zipursky reject.20 Thus, the source of the content of the wrongs is critical.  
Goldberg and Zipursky generally describe the wrongs that comprise tort law as 
violations of context-specific social norms that have been elevated, usually by 
judges, to the status of law.21 Social norms are “obligations already recognized in 
familiar forms of social interaction.”22 With regard to torts, these norms are “social 
norms of safe conduct” or “safety norms.”23 Goldberg and Zipursky elaborate and 
emphasize the norms depend on context: “In different settings and situations, with 
respect to different sorts of interactions, individuals conceive of themselves as 
occupying different sorts of normative space governed by different norms of 
responsibility that impose different sorts of demands or expectations of them.”24 
Tort law “carves up the social world into ‘loci of responsibility’—i.e., particular 
contexts governed by norms of appropriate conduct that actors must observe for the 
benefit of identifiable classes of potential victims.”25 
Of course, not all social norms become law, nor should they. Which social 
norms are selected for elevation to legal status? Goldberg and Zipursky are 
relatively silent on this process thus far. In a prior article, I briefly suggested that 
Goldberg and Zipursky implicitly rely on Benjamin Cardozo’s theory of law and 
judging in framing civil recourse theory.26 Cardozo’s view of law, according to 
Goldberg, is that “the proper function of the law is to articulate and enforce at least 
some of the obligations recognized in and by the community.”27 Judges (and, 
occasionally, legislatures) have the task of determining which social norms to 
elevate to legal wrongs.28 Furthermore, some legal wrongs have no correlation to 
                                                                                                                 
Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1014 (2006). 
 20. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 948 (defining “vacuous” as “a legal wrong 
being anything the law defines as a legal wrong”). 
 21. Robinette, supra note 7, at 436–37. 
 22. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 5, at 392. 
 23. John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the 
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 608 (2005). 
 24. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 5, at 392. 
 25. Goldberg, supra note 23, at 608 (citing Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 5, at 403–
04). 
 26. Robinette, supra note 7, at 437 n.34. 
 27. John C.P. Goldberg, Note, Community and the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing 
Cardozo’s Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1335 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
 28. On this point, Goldberg & Zipursky elaborate: 
Nevertheless, because law comes with consequences that morality does not 
(most obviously state-enforced sanctions), and because there are, at times, 
demands on law that it take a certain form that renders it efficacious, capable of 
being internalized, and amenable to application by judges, there will be times at 
which it is appropriate for legislatures and judges and jurors to decline to 
elevate certain moral norms to legal norms. Similarly, there are sometimes 
reasons that favor recognition of legal norms that do not have counterparts in 
morality. 
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morality, and judges (or, less often, legislatures) must decide when to create legal 
wrongs with no moral counterpart. 
What role, if any, does instrumentalism play in this process? Recently, Goldberg 
and Zipursky acknowledged “instrumental considerations actively shap[e] the 
nature of what the courts or legislatures are willing to count as ‘wrongs,’” even 
labeling this an “important phenomenon.”29 Moreover, they describe the process of 
creating a new legal wrong in the context of strict liability for products in the 1960s 
and 1970s: “judges, on the basis of a variety of considerations, decided to cobble 
together a new legal wrong out of a mix of existing doctrinal materials and policy 
considerations, one that commercial sellers are directed not to commit and that 
confers a right on consumers.”30 The policy considerations involved were 
compensation and deterrence,31 and Goldberg and Zipursky seemingly 
acknowledge that “these goals are being served by products liability law and that 
they have played an important motivational role in courts’ decisions to adopt the 
doctrine.”32 
The assertion that tort law is unitary and its purpose is not to deliver 
compensation and deterrence is hard to square with this account. If an important 
reason courts created the legal wrong of strict products liability was to compensate 
and to deter,33 and strict products liability does, in fact, serve the goals of 
compensation and deterrence, it seems to me that at least a purpose of the law is to 
compensate and deter. This is true even if products liability is described as a “norm 
that products are to be sold in a condition that is safe for ordinary use.”34 The 
wrong is being created, at least in part, as an instrument to compensate the injured 
and deter similar injuries. There is still a wrong in the sense defined by civil 
recourse theory. It is a relational wrong (a wrong by the producer to the consumer), 
that is a legal wrong (it was elevated to that status by judges or by the legislature), 
                                                                                                                 
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of 
View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1586 (2006). 
 29. Goldberg & Zipursky Respond to the Quandaries Facing Civil Recourse Theory, 
supra note 2. 
 30. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 3, at 303. 
 31. Id. at 302. 
 32. Id. at 303.  
 33. Goldberg and Zipursky are forced to concede this. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). As George Priest noted, “The power of 
the Greenman opinion is through its reference to Traynor’s concurring opinion is Escola.” 
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual 
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 507 n.296 (1985). Traynor’s 
Escola concurrence laid out an explicitly instrumentalist rationale for products liability. 
Traynor started with deterrence: “[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed 
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective 
products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some 
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.” Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944). However, because not all injuries can 
be prevented, strict liability would also help spread the losses caused by those injuries: “The 
cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the 
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer 
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.” Id. at 441.  
 34. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 3, at 286. 
548 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:543 
 
and injurious (based on the consumer being hurt). However, the wrong is at least 
partially being used to affect the world beyond the parties involved in the injury; 
law is being used as an instrument. Goldberg and Zipursky’s descriptive account 
fits pluralism better than the unitary vision of civil recourse. 
The cautious and conditional language Goldberg and Zipursky select 
emphasizes this point. They state:  
To say that these goals [compensation and deterrence] are being served 
by products liability law and that they have played an important 
motivational role in courts’ decisions to adopt the doctrine is not to
 say that products liability law (much less tort law in general) is nothing 
more than a means for achieving these goals. A body of law has a 
content and a life that stands at least somewhat independently of the 
reasons that may have justified its adoption.35 
There is a significant middle ground between the idea that tort law is unified by 
wrongs and the idea that it is “nothing more” than a means for achieving 
compensation and deterrence. Similarly, the assertion that tort law stands “at least 
somewhat independently” from the reasons justifying its adoption does not mean 
those reasons are not a purpose of torts.  
II. THE CONCESSIONS 
Goldberg and Zipursky have conceded that some parts of tort law do not fully 
correspond to civil recourse’s explanatory power.36 Most of the concessions cover 
relatively uncommon areas of tort law—wrongful death and survival actions,37 
some applications of transferred intent,38 strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities,39 and aspects of punitive damages.40 Two of their concessions, however, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. Id. at 302–03 (emphasis in original). 
 36. See Robinette, supra note 7, at 445–47. 
 37. John C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1315, 1341 n.71 (2003) (“Legislatures have occasionally relaxed the wronging requirement, 
as by enacting survival and wrongful death actions that permit certain beneficiaries to sue 
those who have wronged their decedent.”). This was done for compensatory purposes. See 
JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE 
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 53–54 (2004). 
 38. Goldberg, supra note 37, at 1341 n.71. Goldberg concedes, “It is possible, 
moreover, that the common law also recognizes limited exceptions to the wronging 
requirement. This may be the case, for example, with respect to certain applications of 
‘transferred intent.’” Id. He notes that this would “depend on whether the tortfeasor’s 
intentional [actions] toward one person [would] also constitute[]” wrongful actions toward 
the person actually injured. Id. 
 39. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 951; see also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra 
note 28, at 1586 n.72 (stating that abnormally dangerous activities may be “instances in 
which tort law functions as a scheme of liability rules (or as Keeton-esque ‘conditional 
duties’)”).  
 40. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 1141 n.58 (“Considerations of deterrence 
frequently influence the size of [a punitive damages] award.”). Still, punitive damages are 
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are more significant: statutes41 and routinization.42 The remainder of the Article is 
devoted to routinization. As a whole, the amount and scope of the concessions 
renders civil recourse theory implicitly pluralist. 
What is routinization and why is it at odds with a unitary vision of tort law as a 
system of individualized justice for the redress of wrongs? Tort law as a system of 
individualized justice with a jury as decision maker is necessarily fact specific and, 
at least on a case-by-case basis, often unpredictable. According to Goldberg and 
Zipursky, routinization is an attempt to create a form of “orderliness and 
predictability that is conducive to individuals’ planning their lives.”43  
Workers’ compensation is a prime example, but “informal” routinization has 
occurred in tort law without legislation.44 Goldberg and Zipursky describe the 
process and the benefits to affected parties. The stakeholders in the tort system—
repeat-player defendants, insurers, and practicing lawyers—generally have an 
interest in tort law operating more predictably.45 Defendants prefer predictable 
liability payments because it allows them to plan ahead. Insurers also prefer 
predictable payments because it allows them to set premiums more accurately and 
ensure that they earn profits. Plaintiffs’ lawyers working on a contingent fee prefer 
a large judgment or settlement in relation to the amount of hours spent on the case. 
Within ethical bounds, this often favors the prompt resolution of cases. Thus, 
Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge, “lawyers have increasingly sought to manage 
the resolution of tort cases privately through pretrial negotiations and settlement.”46 
In its simplest form, this involves only the filing of a claim, the defense lawyer’s 
failed attempt to have it dismissed, and then settlement at the amount of the 
insurer’s coverage.47 
Goldberg and Zipursky concede the benefits of routinization: reduced 
transaction costs, swifter compensation, and a reduction in uncertainty and 
variation.48 Still, routinization “raises potential red flags”49 for Goldberg and 
Zipursky. First, Goldberg and Zipursky assert that “[t]ort claimants often are 
looking not just for a payment, but also for a sense that their claims are being taken 
seriously and that they have to some extent been vindicated.”50 Second, they 
believe that the demise of judicial proceedings in favor of insurance-driven 
routinization “will somewhat weaken the elaborate system of checks and balances 
that has been regarded in Anglo-American political thought as central to sound 
                                                                                                                 
“largely” a matter of the “plaintiff’s expanded right of individual redress.” Id. (citing 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005)). 
 41. See Robinette, supra note 7, at 456; E-mail from Benjamin C. Zipursky, Assoc. 
Dean for Research, Professor of Law, Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, to Christopher J. 
Robinette, Assoc. Professor of Law, Widener Univ. Sch. of Law (Dec. 5, 2010, 11:56:25 
EST) (on file with author). 
 42. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 3, at 394–97. 
 43. Id. at 394. 
 44. Id. at 394–96. 
 45. Id. at 395. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 395–96. 
 48. Id. at 396. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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political design,”51 specifically “the right to have one’s claims heard and 
adjudicated.”52 Third, they contend that routinization “threatens to undermine tort 
law as a public practice in which standards of right and wrong are set,”53 such that 
“the law may increasingly fail to provide guidance to the citizenry as to how they 
are obligated to act toward one another.”54 In short, Goldberg and Zipursky 
acknowledge that “[a]s a body of law that requires often nuanced, context-specific 
judgments about wrongdoing and responsibility, tort law is in some ways out of 
synch with [routinization].”55 
III. ROUTINIZATION IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CLAIMS 
The problem with simultaneously arguing that tort law is unified by wrongs and 
acknowledging that it is out of synch with routinization is that routinization is 
prevalent in the American tort system. Routinization is neither a recent 
development nor an anomaly in tort law. Before workplace injury claims were 
formally routinized by workers’ compensation in the early twentieth century,56 they 
were informally routinized. Samuel Issacharoff and John Fabian Witt chronicle the 
settlement practices that arose between insurers and workplace injury tort 
claimants, sometimes represented by “brokers.”57 They conclude: “[W]hen one 
actually looks beyond the [formal system], and instead focuses on the ground-level 
practices of claims resolution in the first American experience of mass harm, one 
finds a tort system that informally functioned much like the formal workmen’s 
compensation system that replaced it.”58 In fact, according to Issacharoff and Witt, 
“[m]ature torts [are those] that over time develop repetitive fact patterns and repeat-
play constituencies[, and] have persistently resolved themselves into what are 
essentially bureaucratized, aggregate settlement structures.”59 In short, they are 
routinized. 
As Goldberg and Zipursky describe it, routinization is an attempt to make tort 
law more predictable and efficient; enhanced administrability is the goal. The 
repeat players in the tort system all benefit in some way. The predictability allows 
defendants to plan ahead, insurers to set premiums, and plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
manage the risk in their portfolio of cases. From the claimants’ perspective, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. Id. at 396–97. 
 52. Id. at 397. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 394. 
 56. See Robinette, supra note 7, at 458–63. 
 57. Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: 
An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1584–96 (2004). 
 58. Id. at 1595. 
 59. Id. at 1573; see also MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE 
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 255 (1996) (“It is no secret to those 
even modestly familiar with the personal injury system that the ideal of individualized 
adjudication, with respect for and attention to the details of the claim, faithful attorney-
agents reflecting the interests and desires of the clients, and arbiters listening carefully and 
respectfully to the claims and stories of the parties is a myth.”). 
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routinization provides compensation that is certain and delivered more swiftly, and, 
in automobile accident cases, almost always from a pool of compulsory insurance 
funds. Thus, routinization is based in instrumental principles of administrability 
and compensation.  
Modern examples of routinization in tort law include asbestos and Dalkon 
Shield claims. Asbestos is “the paradigmatic case” of routinization.60 High 
concentrations of claims are handled by particular claimants’ agents (creating 
repeat players), there are very few trials, and there is standardized treatment of 
settlement amounts.61 Moreover, asbestos firms began going bankrupt in 1988 and 
now the vast majority of claims are administered by trusts, further increasing 
routinization.62 Nearly all of the existing asbestos personal injury trusts with assets 
of more than $1 billion have retained the Analysis Research Planning Corporation 
(ARPC) to manage them.63 To help serve the trusts, ARPC “developed and 
implemented state-of-the-art, web-based claims-processing systems.”64 As a result, 
the “trusts have processed millions of claims and paid billions of dollars efficiently 
and expeditiously, with cost to benefit ratios that are far lower than comparable 
settlement approaches.”65  
A similar trust-based resolution was reached for Dalkon Shield claims. The 
Dalkon Trust (the “Trust”) was established with approximately $2.3 billion to 
compensate the thousands of women claiming injuries from the Dalkon Shield birth 
control device.66 The Trust offered three settlement options. Under Option 1, the 
claimant merely had to state she had used the device and suffered an injury; 
claimants received $725 each under Option 1 (and their husbands received $300).67 
The Trust paid nearly 85,000 Option 1 claims for a total amount of $60 million.68 
Option 2 was for claimants who had good medical proof of use of the device and 
associated injuries, but who also had serious alternative causation problems.69 
Option 2 provided compensation that was reduced from the pre-petition claims 
values because of the causation difficulties;70 payments ranged from $850 to 
$5500.71 Option 3 was supposed to provide settlement offers based on pre-petition 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 57, at 1618.  
 61. Id. at 1619. 
 62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-819, ASBESTOS INJURY 
COMPENSATION: THE ROLE AND ADMINISTRATION OF ASBESTOS TRUSTS 16 (2011), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585380.pdf (“Since the establishment of the first trust in 
1988 through 2010, available data indicate that asbestos trusts have paid about 3.3 million 
claims valued at about $17.5 billion.”). I thank Mike Rustad for this point. 
 63. ARPC, CASE STUDY: MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS OF MASS TORT TRUSTS, 
available at http://www.arpc.com/case-study/management-operations-mass-tort-trusts. 
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claims values. These figures were put together by about thirty attorneys who had 
been active in Dalkon Shield litigation before the bankruptcy.72  
Yet it is automobile accident claims that are emblematic of the importance of 
routinization in our civil justice system. In automobile cases, routinization reduces 
or even eliminates the significance of wrongdoing, the essence of civil recourse. 
Insurance adjusters and plaintiffs’ attorneys resolve many automobile accident 
claims with little or no regard to the fault of the parties. This is a significant 
problem for civil recourse theory because automobile accidents are responsible for 
“an enormous amount of litigation.”73 Automobile accidents constitute a majority 
of all tort claims, and “three-quarters of all payouts in the personal-injury liability 
system.”74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Automobile accidents as a percentage of tort cases.75 
A. Automobile Liability Insurance Becomes Compulsory 
Routinization in automobile accident claims can be traced primarily to liability 
insurance. Policies covering automobile liability appeared soon after the first 
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automobiles were produced at the end of the nineteenth century.76 Coverage, 
originally part of a policy on horse-drawn coaches and carriages, evolved rapidly.77 
Most significantly, the justification of automobile insurance shifted from protecting 
the assets of wealthy drivers to providing compensation for victims.78 Once the 
automobile became common, it caused “a hellish carnage.”79 Automobile accidents 
from 1915–1932 “multiplied over seven times,”80 and, in 1932, “the automobile 
fatality rate ha[d] increased more than 500% since 1913, while the death rate for 
other kinds of accidents show[ed] a decline of over 30% for the same period.”81 
The increased accidents led to increased reliance on tort law to cover the losses.82 
Absent insurance, most individuals and even many businesses could not cover the 
losses caused in automobile accidents.83 
The proliferation of automobiles, and the damage caused by them, as well as the 
need to compensate victims of automobile accidents, caught the attention of 
legislators. In January 1927, new insurance requirements for automobile owners 
went into effect in Massachusetts and Connecticut; Massachusetts adopted a 
compulsory automobile insurance law84 and Connecticut adopted a financial 
responsibility law.85 In the short term, financial responsibility laws were more 
significant. Under a financial responsibility law, a motorist generally did not have 
to purchase automobile insurance until after being involved in an automobile 
accident. After an accident, the motorist was required to prove the ability to pay 
future damages in order to avoid a penalty, frequently the loss of driving 
privileges.86 Typically this proof was made by the purchase of insurance. The 
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inability to cover damages in the initial accident, however, was a weakness, and 
eventually compulsory automobile insurance, under which it is illegal to operate a 
vehicle without an insurance policy already in effect, became the dominant 
approach to automobile insurance. 
Currently forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have enacted 
compulsory automobile insurance.87 Compulsory liability insurance and voluntary 
liability insurance have different focuses. As the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts stated: “The purpose of the compulsory motor vehicle insurance law 
is not, like ordinary insurance, to protect the owner or operator alone from loss, but 
rather is to provide compensation to persons injured through the operation of the 
automobile insured by the owner.”88 
B. Reform Efforts: The Columbia Plan and Keeton-O’Connell 
Indeed, the existence of insurance had a major impact on whether an automobile 
accident victim recovered. In 1932, the Committee to Study Compensation for 
Automobile Accidents, a group of academics, lawyers, and social scientists under 
the auspices of Columbia University, published the “Columbia Plan.” In studying 
the problem of compensation for automobile accidents, the Committee reviewed 
voluminous data. The Committee investigated 2500 closed cases of temporary 
disability in which the defendants were insured and 900 cases in which the 
defendants were uninsured.89 Claimants received money in 86% of the insured 
cases, but only in 27% of the uninsured cases.90 For cases of permanent disability, 
the gap was even more significant. In the 192 closed cases with insured defendants, 
claimants recovered 96% of the time, whereas in the ninety cases without insured 
defendants, claimants recovered only 21% of the time.91 Based on these figures and 
similar data from case studies, the Committee stated, “[I]nsurance companies pay 
in so large a proportion of the cases in which liability insurance is carried, that the 
principle of liability without fault seems almost to be recognized.”92 No American 
jurisdiction enacted the Columbia Plan’s reform proposal; the nation’s attention 
shifted to World War II, and automobile accident reform faded from the spotlight.93 
The next major reform effort for automobile accidents came in 1965, when 
Robert E. Keeton and Jeffrey O’Connell published Basic Protection for the Traffic 
Victim: A Blueprint for Reforming Automobile Insurance.94 Writing over thirty 
years after the Columbia Plan, Keeton and O’Connell reached a similar conclusion 
regarding the role of fault in automobile accident claims. In the automobile claims 
system, compensation was not conditioned on fault of the tortfeasor and nonfault of 
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the victim; instead “the theory of full compensation or none yields to the practice of 
partial compensation in almost every one of the multitude of settlements.”95 Keeton 
and O’Connell also cited statistics, partially derived from studies in the Columbia 
Plan, which showed an extremely high recovery rate in automobile accidents when 
the defendant was insured. Eighty-seven percent of people suffering serious 
personal injury received some money if insurance was involved.96  
Keeton and O’Connell offered a basic description of the process by which 
insurance affects the fault requirement. The most important way in which insurance 
reduces the significance of fault in automobile cases is through settlement 
practices.97 Insurers take a collective view of risk; they appraise claims 
“impersonally by standards appropriate to the management of a large pool of 
risks.”98 An insurer will settle individual claims “whenever this can be done for a 
sum representing an appropriate discount from the probable amount of an award if 
the case should be tried and lost. This discount is tailored to the degree of 
likelihood that the insurer would win if the claim were litigated.”99 The insurer will 
“lose” some by settling cases it could have won at trial, but will “win” some by 
settling for less than it would have lost at trial. “The insurer’s major concern is the 
most economical allocation of available funds to all the claims in the risk pool.”100 
Evidence from the Columbia Plan and Keeton and O’Connell demonstrate that 
automobile accident law has been routinized for at least eighty years.101  
C. The Role of Claims Adjusters 
Five years after Keeton and O’Connell’s book was published, H. Laurence Ross 
provided the classic account of routinization in automobile accidents from the 
perspective of insurance claims adjusters. Entitled Settled Out of Court: The Social 
Process of Insurance Claims Adjustments,102 the book provided considerable 
empirical data about how claims adjusters actually work.103  
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556 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:543 
 
Ross found further evidence that the fault requirement for automobile accidents 
was not strictly applied. Pursuant to formal law, which at that time included 
contributory negligence in all but a handful of jurisdictions, studies suggested “that 
a literal application of these rules would result in very few recoveries.”104 Yet 
actual results were different. Based on the files Ross reviewed, in the “large 
majority of cases . . . a claimant who has provable economic loss will recover 
something.”105 Moreover, “[f]lat denials are very largely confined to trivial 
losses.”106 How did insurance lead to these results? Ross found that the “principal 
pressure”107 on adjusters from their supervisors is to “close cases promptly,”108 and 
adjusters learn quickly that “claims are extinguished most easily by paying 
them.”109  
More significantly, Ross found that when the law is applied by claims adjusters, 
“[l]iability is understood in mechanical terms rather than those of morality which 
are embodied in the formal law.”110 Pursuant to formal law, automobile accident 
claims revolve around issues of liability and damages. As to liability, Ross found 
that individualized treatment of claims was reduced to a focus on traffic laws: 
The formal law of negligence liability, as stated in casebooks from the 
opinions of appellate courts, is not easily applied to the accident at 
Second and Main. It deals with violation of a duty of care owed by the 
insured to the claimant and is based on a very complex and perplexing 
model of the “reasonable man,” in this case the reasonable driver. . . . It 
is not with this intellectual model, however, that claims men must deal. 
In their day-to-day work, the concern with liability is reduced to the 
question of whether either or both parties violated the rules of the road 
as expressed in common traffic laws. Taking the doctrine of negligence 
per se to an extreme doubtless unforeseen by the makers of the formal 
law, adjusters tend to define a claim as one of liability or no liability 
depending only on whether a rule was violated, regardless of intention, 
knowledge, necessity, and other such qualifications that might receive 
sympathetic attention even from a traffic court judge. Such a 
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2013] TWO ROADS DIVERGE FOR CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY 557 
 
determination is far easier than the task proposed in theory by the 
formal law of negligence.111 
Adjusters put cases into broad categories, such as “rear-enders, red-light cases, stop 
sign cases, and the like.”112 According to Ross, “[t]he price paid is reduction of any 
meaningful consideration of fault, and the substitution of mechanical presumption 
for scientifically based investigation.”113 
Simplification is also seen in the damages portion of claims adjustment. 
Damages cases are divided into two categories based on level of severity of the 
injuries.114 For the smaller or “routine” cases, a formula is used. Formal law would 
have a claimant compensated for the pain and suffering she subjectively 
experienced. Yet, routine cases “are investigated very superficially, and their 
evaluation is relatively mechanical and conventional.”115 Routine cases are valued 
by some multiple of medical bills.116 Ross noted, “[t]he formula method is 
mechanical and artificial, but it is efficient as a means of disposing of a large 
workload of claims.”117 Even in the larger, nonroutine cases in which there is a 
deeper and more subtle evaluation, the formula provides a starting point for 
negotiation.118 
It is an important caveat that Ross found formal law relevant to the claims 
process. He did not assert that the two were disconnected: “payment does follow 
liability and damages, at least as these are interpreted by the insurance 
company.”119 Still the limitations are quite loose, especially for liability: “As 
liability becomes more questionable, the claim becomes ‘worth’ less in the 
adjuster’s eyes. When there are strong doubts as to the insured’s negligence, 
or . . . evidence of contributory negligence[,] . . . the adjuster will define the claim 
as one ‘for compromise.’”120 Yet, even under these circumstances “the adjuster is 
reluctant to pay less than medical bills.”121 Moreover, some payment is made in the 
vast majority of cases with high damages, regardless of the facts on liability.122 
From a damages perspective, a potential jury verdict is irrelevant for routine 
cases.123 Although a potential jury verdict is relevant for larger cases, even these 
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are somewhat routinized.124 Examples include comparison with other “similar” 
cases in jury verdict reports and various published formulas made available to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.125 In sum, “even a highly individualistic law, when required to 
handle masses of cases, becomes categorical.”126  
A final point from Ross’s book about the relationship between formal law and 
the claims adjustment process is the relative importance of the defendant-insured 
and a repeat-player plaintiffs’ attorney. In theory, the defendant-insured should play 
a large role in the process. He is the person allegedly in the wrong. Yet Ross notes 
the defendant-insured has a mere “walk-on” role in the claims process.127 This 
conclusion is supported by the 1964 “Conard Study” of automobile accidents in 
Michigan.128 Conard and his colleagues concluded “the defendant plays a relatively 
minor role in the litigation process, even though it is the determination of his guilt 
or innocence that is the focal point of the process.”129 When asked if their case had 
settled, 92% of the defendants stated that it had; however, 33% did not know the 
outcome (whether plaintiff had received a settlement).130 The remaining 8% 
incorrectly stated that “the case had not been settled, that no suit had ever been filed 
against them, or that they were not familiar with the outcome of the case.”131 
On the other hand, a repeat-player plaintiffs’ attorney may lead to a higher 
evaluation of a claim, particularly one that is marginal.132 This is because, “[a]n 
attorney frustrated in his commitment to his client, or one who is forced to handle a 
claim at a net loss, may be a bitter and more formidable opponent in future 
negotiations.”133 After all, the insurer’s primary incentive is to achieve profitability 
over its portfolio as a whole. Civil recourse theory does not account for the role 
adjusters play in tort law. 
D. The Role of Plaintiffs’ Lawyers and Settlement Mills 
The larger role of plaintiffs’ attorneys in routinizing automobile accident claims, 
accompanying that of claims adjusters, was refined by Issacharoff and Witt.134 
Except for some isolated exceptions in urban areas,135 early twentieth century 
plaintiffs’ lawyers did not generally approach automobile accidents in a 
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coordinated, systematic way. That began to change in 1946, when a group of 
workers’ compensation claimants’ lawyers formed the National Association of 
Claimants’ Compensation Attorneys (NACCA)136 to increase the clout of claimants 
and their lawyers in the administration of workers’ compensation. Soon thereafter, 
the group’s focus expanded to include tort cases, particularly automobile accidents. 
Famed trial lawyer Melvin Belli joined the group in 1949 at its convention in 
Cleveland.137 Belli was named NACCA’s president in 1951; the following year he 
began giving “Belli Seminars” at the group’s annual convention.138 In these 
seminars, the lawyers shared information on trial and settlement practices, 
including specific information on expert witnesses, product defects, and other 
details about the cases they had across America.139 In 1971, to acknowledge the 
expansion of the group’s goals, it was renamed the American Trial Lawyers 
Association (ATLA).140 
The coordination of plaintiffs’ lawyers had important effects. The sharing of 
information about settlement techniques and verdict values helped the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers overcome the information advantage insurers had long enjoyed. Referral 
networks created specialization on the plaintiffs’ side that already existed for 
defendants. Personal injury cases were being consolidated; generalists handled 
them less often.141 From a routinization standpoint, this was significant. Many more 
automobile accident cases now had repeat players on both sides. Although repeat-
player plaintiffs’ lawyers could be threatening to repeat-player defendants, there 
were also advantages: “the presence of bargaining agents who knew the short-cuts, 
the heuristics, and the rules-of-thumb often made the settlement process 
considerably more efficient.”142 The repeat-player dynamics led to adjusters and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers swapping cases,143 whereby if one case was settled at 50% 
another would be as well, or engaging in “package deals” in which a great many 
cases were settled at one time.144 
Because of this efficiency, by the mid-1960s automobile accident claims were 
being settled at a much faster rate than other tort claims.145 Issacharoff and Witt 
offered empirical data that automobile accident claims were settled so rapidly that 
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they were more analogous to formally routinized workers’ compensation claims 
than they were to other tort claims: “The striking feature is the similarity of the 
mature tort injury system in auto claims to the administrative system of workmen’s 
compensation.”146 Both the formal and informal systems compensated much larger 
percentages of victims than formal tort doctrine would have allowed, by providing 
awards that were smaller, but more certain, than was theoretically available through 
litigation.147 This was accomplished in both systems by simplification—rule-of-
thumb categorization and “stereotyped claims practices, rather than conducting 
individualized inquiries, to determine questions of compensation.”148 
Nora Freeman Engstrom recently chronicled the next stage in the routinization 
of automobile accident claims. Over the past three decades, a new business model 
in plaintiffs’ personal injury firms has emerged: the “settlement mill.”149 Settlement 
mills are “high-volume personal injury law practices that aggressively advertise 
and mass produce the resolution of claims, typically with little client interaction 
and without initiating lawsuits, much less taking claims to trial.”150 The favorite 
claim of these settlement mills is the automobile accident.151  
According to Engstrom, at least three factors led to an evolution of conventional 
plaintiffs’ firms to settlement mills: (1) advertising; (2) the widespread acceptance 
of contingency fees, particularly tiered fees; and (3) the increasingly hostile 
litigation environment for personal injury cases.152 The most important factor was 
the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,153 holding that 
attorney advertising was entitled to First Amendment protection. Because 
advertising tends to attract small claims, it is best suited for a high volume business 
model.154 Moreover, Engstrom argues that the advent of the tiered contingent fee 
contract, originally designed to spur additional attorney effort, instead gave 
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attorneys a means to dissuade clients from insisting on proceeding with 
litigation.155 Finally, increasing litigation costs and decreasing median jury trial tort 
awards, and awareness of the same by plaintiffs’ lawyers, made it less attractive to 
take cases to trial.156 
Settlement mills push the law further from a focus on individualized justice and 
the fault standard. The focus of settlement mills is on volume; settlement mill 
attorneys often have triple the caseload of conventional personal injury attorneys.157 
Engstrom notes that “[e]fficiency trumps process and quality.”158 Settlement mills 
decline few cases; one interviewee noted the “modus operandi was to sign 
everything up.”159 Thus, “[f]actual investigations are short-circuited or skipped 
altogether.”160 Many of the settlement mill employees interviewed by Engstrom 
were explicit: “[T]here was never any investigation done of the claim . . . . The only 
investigation that was ever done was whether or not someone had insurance.”161 
Two other employees of the same firm answered simply “[n]one” to a question 
about the extent of an investigation performed by the firm.162 Much of the work in 
settlement mills, including negotiating with insurance adjusters, is performed by 
non-lawyers.163 The primary incentive for settlement mill employees—lawyers and 
non-lawyers alike—is to close files.164 Thus, when an insurance adjuster is 
negotiating with a representative from a settlement mill, the primary incentive on 
both sides is to close the file.165 Although conventionally represented automobile 
accident plaintiffs rarely try a case to verdict—approximately 2.8%166—the rates at 
settlement mills are far lower. Engstrom calculated rates of approximately 0.5%, 
0.3%, and 0.2% for various settlement mills.167 Despite settlement mills’ “cattle 
call” nature of signing up clients, cases in which an insurer makes no offer at all are 
quite rare.168  
According to Engstrom, this system, providing “near universal (though 
sometimes partial) compensation,” does not support the conventional wisdom that 
parties “bargain in the shadow of the law.”169 First, the parties are not motivated by 
their knowledge of how similar cases fared at trial because settlement mill 
negotiators typically lack this knowledge.170 Second, the parties are not motivated 
by their prediction of how this particular case would fare at trial because settlement 
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mill negotiators perform, at best, cursory investigations of the facts.171 Third, 
settlement mill attorneys are simply not prepared to go to trial, so there is no real 
alternative to settling the case.172  
How, then, are claims valued? “Going rates.”173 Engstrom acknowledges that 
going rates “reflect well-established legal rules and entitlements and bear some 
relation to past trial verdicts,” but the relationship is “muted” and “relatively 
unaffected by the many merit- and non-merit-based factors that would serve to 
increase or decrease a claim’s value in a court of law.”174 In essence: 
Instead of an individualized and fact-intensive analysis of each case’s 
strengths and weaknesses alongside a careful study of case law and 
comparable jury verdicts, settlement mill negotiators and insurance 
claims adjusters assign values to claims with little regard to fault based 
on agreed-upon formulas, keyed off lost work, type and length of 
treatment, property damage, and/or medical bills, which in turn relate to 
the severity of the injury.175 
While ostensibly operating within traditional tort law, settlement mills function 
more like no-fault insurance, providing fairly certain and standardized sums at 
relatively low systemic cost.176 
A significant issue is the number of settlement mills operating in America. 
Engstrom admits that if the model she described was limited to the eight firms she 
investigated, it would be interesting but not very important.177 She further 
acknowledges the impossibility of an exact calculation. Engstrom, however, 
presents anecdotal and empirical evidence that settlement mills are fairly common. 
First, anecdotal evidence exists from interviews with insurance claims adjusters. In 
a disciplinary hearing in Louisiana, an attorney sought to demonstrate that his use 
of non-lawyers to negotiate with insurance adjusters was unremarkable. The 
adjusters named at least ten firms in the state, exclusive of firms Engstrom 
interviewed, that followed the practice.178 One adjuster even stated that the majority 
of her negotiations were with non-lawyers.179 Conventional personal injury 
plaintiffs’ firms are extremely unlikely to allow non-lawyers to negotiate with 
insurers.180 Moreover, researchers are beginning to publish descriptions of firms 
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. Id. at 1531–32 (“Most of the cases I handled, I didn’t even know the facts of the 
case.”). 
 172. Id. at 1532. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. at 1533. 
 175. Id. at 1534 (footnote omitted). 
 176. Engstrom, supra note 151, at 809. 
 177. See Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1514. She has since compiled information on 
another four firms, bringing the total to twelve firms in ten different states. Nora Freeman 
Engstrom, Legal Access and Attorney Advertising, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
1083, 1083 (2011). 
 178. Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1518. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. I was an associate at a conventional personal injury plaintiffs’ firm from 1996 
until 2003. Non-lawyers never negotiated with insurers at our firm, and I knew of no firm at 
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with settlement mill features.181 The empirical evidence consists of two sets of data 
indicating substantial decreases in tort filings during time periods in which 
automobile accident and injury rates increased.182 Engstrom notes these 
counter-intuitive trends, more accidents and injuries with more lawyer 
representation yet fewer lawsuits, are consistent with the rise of settlement mills. 
As RAND stated while trying to make sense of these trends: “[I]t appears they are 
being settled elsewhere, in forums that produce stable, predictable outcomes.”183 
In sum, civil recourse theory, an avowedly descriptive theory that holds tort law 
to be unified by wrongs, does not accurately describe the treatment of many 
automobile accident claims. Treatment of an automobile accident as a wrong is the 
exception and not the rule because many repeat players on both sides are more 
interested in their portfolios as a whole than the outcome of particular cases. Thus, 
even when adjusters have strong doubts on liability, they are reluctant to pay less 
than the medical bills, and some amount of payment is made in the vast majority of 
cases with high damages regardless of the facts on liability.184 For most automobile 
accident claims, the system provides not the redress of wrongs, but predictability of 
payments for insurers and compensation that is more swift and certain for plaintiffs. 
                                                                                                                 
which that occurred.  
 181. Id. at 1520–21. See also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: 
Dealing with the Possible But Not Certain, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 337, 356 (2011).  
One highly respected plaintiffs’ lawyer was emphatic in his criticism of 
television advertising, which to him seems unprofessional. What especially 
bothered him “are the people who are not competent to handle business, that 
advertise, get the business, and then instead of referring the better cases, they 
handle those cases in a less than satisfactory way. They make a fee on it, but 
their client is not very well served. The way they make their money is on a 
volume practice. I view those people as bottom feeders.” Another lawyer said 
that heavy advertisers “are not fulfilling a role as an attorney, they’re doing 
nothing but adjusting claims from the plaintiffs’ standpoint.” 
Id. A former student recently requested a reference for a position, but confided that she was 
worried the firm might be “a mill.” 
 182. Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1519–20. In one study, from 1977 to 1997, lawyer 
participation in the settlement of third-party automobile accident personal injury claims 
increased significantly, yet the chance that any particular claim would produce a lawsuit 
dropped dramatically. Mark J. Browne & Joan T. Schmit, Patterns in Personal Automobile 
Third-Party Bodily Injury Litigation: 1977-1997 (Sept. 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=588481. In the second study, during 1992–2001, the National 
Center for State Courts reports that automobile tort filings declined 14% in the seventeen 
states (with 53% of the U.S. population) covered by available data. Engstrom, supra note 
149, at 1519 (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE 
COURTS, 2002: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 26 (2002)). 
During the same period, the number of traffic accidents with injuries and the number of 
overall traffic accidents both increased. Id. at 1519–20 (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & 
ANALYSIS, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2005, at 1).  
 183. Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1520 (citing DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN 
TORT LITIGATION 8–9, 32 (1987)). In many ways, the foregoing critique is an elaboration of 
Mike Rustad’s point that civil recourse does not sufficiently account for major players in the 
tort system, such as insurers and plaintiffs’ lawyers. See Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public 
Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 480 (2011). 
 184. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.  
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As noted recourse theorist Jason Solomon stated: “Because of the now-routinized 
system of insurance claims, it may well be that the most common type of tort claim 
is quite far from the ideals of civil justice.”185 
E. Responses 
Goldberg has already responded to the general idea that “settlement and 
insurance have rendered tort law obsolete.”186 He made four main points in 
response. However, Goldberg’s arguments are weakened by the automobile 
accident context. Although I agree with Goldberg that settlement and insurance 
have not rendered tort law obsolete, at least as applied to automobile accidents, I 
believe they demonstrate that neither is tort law unitary.  
First, and most significantly, Goldberg argued that tort claims are still processed 
in “the shadow of the law;”187 the settlement process takes cues from formal law on 
liability and damages. The problem for Goldberg is that the shadow of the law 
becomes faint on the crucial issue of liability in many automobile accident cases.188 
On the question of whether torts are wrongs, the category that matters is liability. 
According to the more traditional model chronicled by Ross, the shadow of the law 
provides loose constraints to settlement. Even when evidence of liability was weak, 
adjusters were described as reluctant to offer less than the costs of medical bills.189 
The larger the damages in an automobile accident case, the more important the 
shadow of the law becomes.190 However, even in the vast majority of claims with 
high damages, some amount of compensation was paid regardless of the facts on 
liability.191 Engstrom’s scholarship on settlement mills is suggestive of a category 
of law firm for which the shadow of the law on liability virtually disappears. In 
cases involving settlement mills, the firms accept almost all clients and receive an 
offer for some amount of compensation for almost all of them. Engstrom noted one 
mill accepted 2107 of 2204 potential automobile accident clients.192 Yet the 
proportion of cases that receive no offer from insurers is miniscule; in multiple 
interviews with settlement attorneys in different firms, the attorneys estimated the 
percentage of “no offer” cases at less than 1%.193 Even if it were conceded that 
formal law was based on the non-instrumentalist wrongs described by civil 
recourse theory,194 insurance-driven settlement practices reduce or eliminate the 
importance of wrongs in many cases. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. Jason M. Solomon, What is Civil Justice?, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 331 (2010). 
 186. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1264. For a list of ways that liability insurance shapes 
tort, see Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability 
Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2005).  
 187. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1264–65. 
 188. I thank Tom Baker for helping me understand the scope of this point. 
 189. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 190. See ROSS, supra note 102, at 135. 
 191. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 192. Engstrom, supra note 149, at 1511. 
 193. Id. at 1517 n.207. One attorney estimated his percentage of “no offer” cases as high 
as 20%, but his claims were all valued in excess of $25,000. Id.  
 194. I think formal law is more complicated. Automobile accident claims in most 
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Second, Goldberg argued an actual jury holding is not necessary for tort law to 
operate as a law for redressing wrongs. As long as governments provide courts to 
adjudicate claims for wrongs and claimants have the ability to access them, that is 
sufficient. It is acceptable if such access results in “negotiated settlement conducted 
on terms shaped by governing law.”195 As to this second point, I agree that an 
actual jury verdict is not necessary for tort to function as a system for redressing 
wrongs in the way that Goldberg and Zipursky describe. However, on the issue of 
liability, as just noted, governing law’s role in shaping automobile accident 
settlements is not robust. Moreover, the sheer amount of settled, as opposed to 
tried, cases demonstrates that claimants have multiple objectives in pursuing 
claims. Recall that less than three percent of automobile cases are tried to 
verdict.196 Undoubtedly, as Goldberg and Zipursky remind us, some claimants want 
vindication and to be taken seriously. But the ultimate vindication is a jury verdict 
in the claimant’s favor, a public acknowledgment of the claimant’s victory. If that 
was all that motivated claimants, far fewer cases would end in a compromised 
claim with the claimant accepting the defendant’s statement denying wrongdoing 
and perhaps a confidentiality provision. Other factors, such as compensation—
which can be especially pressing for some claimants—and general peace must 
factor into the calculations of many of them.  
Third, Goldberg asserted that even though insurance can blunt the extent to 
which wrongdoers are required to answer for their wrongs, it also makes redress 
available to victims who would not otherwise obtain it. In fact, Goldberg argued it 
instantiates a sense of responsibility to others: “To purchase liability insurance is to 
acknowledge, at a basic level, one’s tort duties.”197 Here, too, I agree with much of 
Goldberg’s argument. Insurance undermines the direct link between wrongdoers 
and the consequences of their actions. But it plays many positive roles. It allows for 
victims to be compensated, and it can serve a regulatory function.198 Yet, on this 
point as well, automobile accidents differ from many tort causes of action. It is 
possible to see the purchase of liability insurance, especially voluntary liability 
insurance, as an acknowledgment of tort duties. On the other hand, it is also 
possible to see it as the selfish (but reasonable) desire to protect personal assets. 
                                                                                                                 
jurisdictions are formally premised on negligence. Every element of negligence includes 
instrumentalism. Duty is often a multi-factor policy analysis, including factors such as 
concern over “crushing exposure to liability.” Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36 
(N.Y. 1985). In the breach analysis, formally governed by the instrumentalist-inspired 
objective standard, “utility” is often considered. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 
cmt. d (1965). Proximate cause often involves courts’ use of “public policy” and “practical 
politics” from Judge Andrews’s dissent in Palsgraf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 
N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). Finally, damages may be capped for 
instrumentalist efficiency reasons. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) 
(LexisNexis 2006) (passing a $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury 
actions to ease perceived pressure on liability insurers); see Alan Calnan, The Distorted 
Reality of Civil Recourse Theory, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 159, 183–92 (2012); Robinette, supra 
note 7, at 482–83. 
 195. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1266. 
 196. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 197. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1269. 
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433 (2010). 
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Automobile insurance, because it is compulsory, is another step removed. Motorists 
may purchase compulsory insurance because it is required of them. And it is 
required of them because the scope of automobile accident injuries reached such a 
level of “hellish carnage”199 that it became an issue of public policy, acted on by 
legislatures.  
Finally, Goldberg argued that tort law sets standards of proper conduct, and it 
often performs this function regardless of whether litigation arises.200 Although this 
argument may be stronger for non-automobile cases, there are two serious 
problems with arguing that automobile accident law sets standards of proper 
driving. First, the (vague) negligence standard in the automobile accident context 
has been largely subsumed by traffic law. Insurance adjusters and lawyers do not 
typically inquire as to whether a given driver has driven “reasonably under the 
circumstances” (which standard would provide no guidance to drivers anyway). 
They instead ask an easier question. Namely, Ross tells us they rely on traffic laws 
in adjusting the vast majority of claims.201 In essence, the legislature sets the 
standard that tort law then borrows.202 Of course, it is not then true that tort is 
setting standards. Second, even if the guidance of formal tort law was specific and 
useful, most drivers would not know it. Absent special circumstances, the average 
driver does not follow automobile accident decisions in her jurisdiction. Unlike tort 
causes of action involving institutional defendants, say medical malpractice and 
hospitals or products liability and manufacturers, drivers do not typically have a 
supervisor or someone with an incentive to follow tort doctrine and keep them 
apprised of it. Traffic laws, many of which are actually posted on signs on the 
highway, are quite different. But again, drivers do not know tort law; they know 
traffic law. 
CONCLUSION 
Civil recourse theory is rich, subtle, and comprehensive. It has been extremely 
influential in tort theory, and is now affecting areas of the law beyond torts. 
Moreover, I think Goldberg and Zipursky deserve considerable credit for shifting 
tort theory back from the view that tort law is only about public policy and that the 
parties’ sole role in a tort suit is implementing it. Yet civil recourse, which is a 
descriptive theory, does not accurately describe tort law.  
Moreover, it distracts theorists from the crucial issue of when to treat claims as 
wrongs and when to treat them as routinized, compensable events. As a descriptive 
matter, tort law already treats claims both ways. The most critical normative 
question in tort law today is how to properly draw the line between the two. As 
discussed earlier, a routinized, compensable treatment of torts provides benefits to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 199. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 200. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1269–70. 
 201. ROSS, supra note 102, at 20 (stating that the investigation of claims “consist[s] 
mainly in discovering violations of the traffic law”). 
 202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 14 cmt. d. (2010) (“[I]n most highway-accident cases, findings of negligence 
depend on ascertaining which party has violated the relevant provisions of the state’s 
motor-vehicle code.”) I thank Nora Engstrom and Kyle Graham for this point. 
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both parties. For defendants, liability payments become more predictable; 
transaction costs such as time and attorneys’ fees are reduced. Plaintiffs receive 
compensation that is much more certain and swift, and avoid many of the 
unpleasant aspects of pursuing a claim in litigation.203 Yet surely some defendants 
have engaged in acts for which this more casual treatment is not appropriate. 
Goldberg and Zipursky are surely correct to note that some claimants are not just 
looking for payment, but rather the sense that their claims are taken seriously; they 
seek vindication.204 There are two types of torts. We need to focus on the best 
way(s) to distinguish them. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 203. For these reasons, Engstrom gives settlement mills a passing grade: “in substance, 
settlement mills have managed to shed a number of tort’s most maligned attributes and 
achieve many of no-fault’s laudable goals: They arguably expand access to compensation, 
reduce court congestion, and offer their clients relative speed, predictability, and certainty, 
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